This paper investigates joint source-channel secrecy for Gaussian broadcast communication in
I. INTRODUCTION
Investigations on joint source-channel coding (JSCC) could trace back to Shannon's pioneering work [1] , where a method was developed for representing any communication system
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arXiv:1607.07040v1 [cs.IT] 24 Jul 2016 [15] . A different formulation of the problem was considered in [18] , where the authors assumed there is a fixed information leakage to the eavesdropper and wish to minimize the distortion at the legitimate receiver, while at the same time providing a graceful distortion degradation when there is an SNR mismatch. They showed that, for a positive leakage, this can be achieved by a hybrid digital-analog coding. This scenario was extended to consider side information at the receiver in [19] or side information at the sender in [20] .
Besides, analog encryption (or analog scrambling) technologies, e.g., sign-change based scheme [17] , permutation based scheme [17] and bandwidth-keeping scheme [21] , can be seen as JSCS scheme as well, although they are not designed for any specified source-channel pair. Signchange based scheme improves secrecy by changing sign of each sample according to secret key. But owing to at most one bit secret key used per sample, this scheme could not provide higher secrecy even with a higher key rate. Permutation based scheme improves secrecy by exchanging the positions of different samples. Ulike sign-change based scheme, it could support any arbitrarily high key rate.
In this paper, we consider joint source-channel secrecy problem of transmitting Gaussian source over Gaussian wiretap broadcast channel in Shannon cipher system (see Fig. 1 ). List secrecy [15] is used to measure secrecy, in which the eavesdropper is allowed to conduct list decoding with fixed list size, and secrecy is measured by the minimum distortion over the entire list. We study the achievable tradeoff of secret key rate, list rate, eavesdropper distortion, and distortions of all legitimate users. For the achievability part, we propose an analog JSCS scheme which cascades a linear coding with a random orthogonal transform. We also analyze scheme for scalar Gaussian communication, and derives its performance. Section IV extends the proposed scheme to vector Gaussian communication. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Problem setup
Consider the Shannon cipher broadcast system with two legitimate users 1 shown in Fig. 1 .
The sender A observes a source sequence S n that is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a Gaussian distribution N (0, λ). Sender A and legitimate users B1 and B2
share a secret key K that is uniformly distributed in 2 nR K 2 and independent of S n . Sender A communicates with legitimate users B1 and B2 through a Gaussian broadcast channel
where Y i is the channel output observed by the i-th legitimate user, and V i is the zero-mean additive Gaussian noise with variance N i . Definition 1. An(n, R K ) block code consists of 1) Encoder: ϕ : R n × 2 nR K → R n ;
2) Decoder i: ψ i : R n × 2 nR K → R n , i = 1, 2.
The encoder and decoders can be stochastic. 1 Although we only consider the system with two legitimate users, our results derived in this paper are easily extended to the cases with more legitimate users. 2 In this paper, the set {1, ..., m} is sometimes denoted by [m] .
Besides, another channel output Z n is wiretapped by an eavesdropper Eve through an AWGN channel
where W is the zero-mean additive Gaussian noise with variance N 0 . Based on Z n , the eavesdropper produces a list of reconstructions L n (Z n ) ⊆ R n and the induced distortion is set to the minimum distortion over the entire list, i.e., minšn ∈Ln(
By exploiting the secret key and the wiretap broadcast channel, for given distortion levels (D 0 , D 1 , D 2 ), Nodes A, B1 and B2 want to communicate the source within distortions D 1 and D 2 , while ensuring that wiretapper's strategy always suffers distortion above D 0 with high probability.
is achievable if there exists a sequence of
2) Power constraint:
where x n n t=1 x 2 t denotes the Euclidean norm; 3) List secrecy:
We assume that the eavesdropper knows all the information, including the (n, R K ) code, but except for the secret key.
B. Henchman problem
The problem above is equivalent to a henchman problem [15] , in which eavesdropper reconstructs a single sequence with the help of a rate-limited henchman who can access to the source S n and the wiretapped signal Z n . As depicted in Fig. 2 , the wiretapper receives the best possible nR n bits from the henchman to assist in producing a reconstruction sequenceŠ n . Fig. 2 . Henchman problem. The rates of henchman codes satisfy lim sup n→∞ 1 n log |Ln| ≤ RL.
Definition 3. The R n henchman code (Hcode) of a (n, R K ) block code consists of
We assume that the wiretapper and henchman are aware of the scheme that Nodes A and B adopt, hence they cooperate to design a code with encoder m = ϕ H (s n , z n ) and decodeř
That is to say the henchman code is designed based on the (n, R K ) block code adopted by sender and legitimate user.
is achievable in the henchman problem if there exists a sequence of (n, R K ) codes such that ∀ > 0,
1) Distortion constraint: (3);
2) Power constraint: (4);
3) Secrecy:
is achievable in the list reconstruction problem if and only if it is achievable in the henchman problem.
Besides, the list secrecy problem and henchman problem are also equivalent to a lossyequivocation secrecy problem; see [16] .
III. MAIN RESULTS (SCALAR GAUSSIAN COMMUNICATION)
A. The Proposed Scheme (Secure Analog Coding Scheme)
The theory of JSCC states that linear coding is optimal for bandwidth-matched Gaussian broadcast communication. On this basis, to improve secrecy and at the same time to retain the optimality in reconstruction distortion, we only encrypt the output signal of linear coding in the phase part by an invertible operation, since encrypting the amplitude of the signal, even by an invertible operation, will always cause a loss of performance in the power-distortion tradeoff.
Orthogonal transform, as one of phase-change operations, has many nice features. Hence it is adopted to improve secrecy in our proposed scheme. The proposed JSCS is described as follows.
Codebook (Public Key) Generation: Generate random n × n matrices Q k , k ∈ 2 nR K independently whose elements are generated i.i.d. according to N (0, 1). Then apply Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization process to the columns of each matrix, hence all the resulting matrices are orthogonal and constitute a subset of orthogonal matrices
. As a public key, the codebook C is revealed to the sender and all the receivers (including the eavesdropper).
Encoding: Upon observing a source sequence s n and a key k , the encoder generates x n as follows.
where α = P λ with 0 ≤ P ≤ P .
Decoding (for Legitimate Users): For legitimate user Bi, upon the received sequence y n i and the key k, the decoder reconstructs the source as follows.
where
, and T T k denotes the transpose of matrix T k . The proposed JSCS scheme cascades the traditional linear joint source-channel coding (analog coding) with a random orthogonal transform. Linear joint source-channel coding coding provide graceful degradation of the transmitted source for different legitimate users, depending on the quality of their channels. The random orthogonal transform is one kind of random phase encryptions, and also is an analog encryption. Next we will analyze the asymptotic performance of the proposed JSCS as blocklength n goes to infinity. At first, we need introduce some properties of the codebook C.
Theorem 1.
[23] Suppose Q is a random n × n matrix with each element independently distributed according to Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). Let Q 1 , Q 2 , · · · , Q n be the columns of Q and let T be the random matrix whose columns are obtained by applying the GramSchmidt orthonormalization procedure to Q 1 , Q 2 , · · · , Q n . Then both T and T T have the uniform distribution (Haar measure) on the set of n × n orthogonal matrices F (n), and moreover for any orthogonal matrix A, both AT and T A also have the uniform distribution on F (n).
Utilizing Theorem 1, we can establish the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Random orthogonal transform x n = T s n with T uniformly distributed on orthogonal matrices set F (n), transforms an arbitrary vector s n ∈ R n into a random vector that is uniformly distributed on the (n − 1)-sphere with radius s n .
Proof: From Theorem 1, without loss of generality we can assume T is obtained in the manner described in Theorem 1. Suppose Let T 1 , T 2 , · · · , T n be the columns of T . From
Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization,
, and for any rotation matrix (or more generally,
. On the other hand, Q 1 is a random vector with each element i.i.d. ∼ N (0, 1), and it is easy to verify that for rotation matrix A, AQ 1 has the same distribution as Q 1 , i.e., normally distributed random vector is invariant to rotation. Therefore, AT 1 has the same distribution as T 1 , i.e., T 1 is also invariant to rotation. This implies T 1 is uniformly distributed on the unit (n − 1)-sphere. In addition, observe
Hence the random matrix T transforms vector (1, 0, · · · , 0) T to a random vector uniformly distributed on the (n − 1)-sphere. For arbitrary vector s n ∈ R n , we can easily find an orthogonal matrix B with the first column
T , and then we have
From Theorem 1, T B has the same distribution as T . Hence
T is also uniformly distributed on the unit (n − 1)-sphere, i.e., T s n is uniformly distributed on the (n − 1)-sphere with radius s n .
Theorem 2 shows a nice feature of random orthogonal transform: The resulting vector will be uniformly distributed on the sphere where the input vector is, if the transform matrix is randomly and uniformly chosen from the set of orthogonal matrices. Utilizing the properties of the codebook C, we can establish the following theorem, the proof of which is given in Appendix A.
achievable by the secure analog scheme above, if and only if
for some P such that 0 ≤ P ≤ P, where
with log + x max {0, log x}.
shown in Theorem 3, P is a variable, and moreover,
other mutually through P which satisfies 0 ≤ P ≤ P . Given (R K , D 0 ), both the minimum of achievable D 1 's or D 2 's and the maximum of achievable R L 's are decreasing in P , which implies for the proposed scheme, transmiting the source using a larger power results in smaller distortions for legitimate users, but also leads to decrypting the source more easily for the wiretapper.
Interestingly, the proposed JSCS scheme with P = P , on one hand, provides a certain level of secrecy, and on the other hand, it does not lose any performance in the reconstruction distortions of legitimate users. The region in Theorem 3 with λ = 1 and P = 1 is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Assume P = 1 is the minimum P satisfying the condition (9), hence (D 1 , D 2 ) has no effect
The condition (9) is consistent with the performance of linear coding [3] . The condition (10), roughly speaking, follows from the following argument. On one hand, the henchman and the wiretapper can ignore the signal Z n and use a R S (D 0 )-rate point-to-point source code to describe
On the other hand, the proposed scheme force the wiretapper's optimal strategy to be an indirect guessing strategy: first, the wiretapper decrypts the secret key by using R K rate, then upon the secret key and wiretaped signal Z n , the wiretapper reconstructs the source within distortion λN 0 P +N 0 (denote the reconstruction as Z ), and finally, upon this reconstruction Z , the wiretapper produces a final reconstruction of the source within distortion D 0 by using In addition, Theorem 3 can be understood from the view of geometry as well. The random orthogonal transform in the proposed scheme guarantees that given Z n , S n has uniform distribution on 2 nR K small (n − 2) −spheres with radius r 2 = This results in Theorem 3.
B. Comparison with Sign-Change Based Scheme
Next we compare the proposed JSCS scheme with another random phase encryption scheme, sign-change based scheme [17] , [16] . Assume R K = 1. Consider the following symbol-bysymbol scheme, in which the blocklength n is set to 1 and the secret key is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}.
Encoding: Upon observing a source sequence s and a key k , the encoder generates x as follows.
where α = P λ with 0 ≤ P ≤ P , and
Decoding (for Legitimate Receivers): For legitimate receiver Bi, upon the received sequence y i and the key k, the decoder reconstructs the source as follows.
It is easy to verify that
where f W denotes the pdf of W ∼ N 0,
. Hence for this scheme, the maximum achievable R L (or equivalently the minimum rate needed to code S within distortion D 0 with twosided information Z) equals the conditional rate-distortion function R S|Z (D 0 ). The performance of the sign-change based scheme is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Sign-Change based Scheme). [16] For Gaussian communication with
is achievable by the sign-change based scheme, if and only if
denotes the rate-distortion function of S with two-sided information Z.
Since it is hard (even if possible) to express R S|Z (D 0 ) in closed form, for ease of comparison between the proposed scheme and the sign-change based scheme, we will derive a closed-form upper bound on R S|Z (D 0 ). The result is shown in the following lemma, the proof of which is given in Appendix D.
Since R S|Z (D 0 ) denotes the minimum rate needed to code S within distortion D 0 when Z is available at both encoder and decoder, we can give a interpretation of the upper bound from the perspective of source coding. First, by ignoring the side information,
should hold, where
is the minimum rate needed to code S without any side information. Second, if by using rate 1 to code the secret key, and upon the reconstruction, we further code the residual error to obtain distortion D 0 by using rate
. This is feasible since the residual error follows Gaussian distribution and the corresponding rate-distribution function is 
is achievable by the sign-change based scheme, then for some P such that 0 ≤ P ≤ P . 
C. Necessary Condition for the Achievability of
For the system with single legitimate user (remove legitimate user B2 from the system in Fig. 1 ), the following necessary condition for the achievability of (R K , R L , P, D 0 , D 1 ) has been proven by Yu et al. [16] .
Theorem 6. [16] For Gaussian communication with single legitimate user, if
is achievable, then
14 By extending Theorem 6 to the case with 2 legitimate users (the system considered in this paper), the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1 (Necessary Condition). For Gaussian communication (with 2 legitimate users), if
Comparing Theorem 3 and Corollary 1, we can identify the optimality of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 7 (Optimality of the Proposed Scheme). For Gaussian communication (with 2 legitimate users), the proposed JSCS scheme is optimal if
Theorem 7 implies under condition that the wiretapper has a better channel than one of legitimate users' and wants to produce a reconstruction with larger distortion than one of legitimate users', or one of legitimate users' distortions is restricted to the Shannon limit, and meanwhile the wiretapper has a worse channel than this legitimate user's and wants to produce a reconstruction with smaller distortion than this legitimate user's, the proposed scheme is optimal.
IV. EXTENSION TO VECTOR GAUSSIAN COMMUNICATION
We also extend the analog JSCS scheme to vector Gaussian communication scenario. Consider
Gaussian broadcast channel
where Y i is the channel output vector observed by the i-th legitimate user, and V i ∼ N (0, diag(
is an additive Gaussian noise vector. An eavesdropper Eve accesses to another channel output Z through a channel
is an additive Gaussian noise vector as well. For vector Gaussian case, Nodes A, B1 and B2 jointly design an(n, R K ) block code consisting of Encoder: ϕ : R mn × 2 nR K → R mn ; and Decoder i:
is achievable for vector Gaussian communication if there exists a sequence of (n, R K ) codes such that ∀ > 0, 1) Total distortion constraint:
is the reconstruction sequence produced by Node Bi;
2) Total power constraint:
Extending the proposed secure analog coding to the vector Gaussian communication case, we have the following JSCS scheme.
[m] , k ∈ 2 nR K independently whose elements are generated dependently according to N (0, 1).
Then we apply Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization process on every matrix, hence all the resulting matrices are orthogonal, and constitute a subset of orthogonal matrices
As a public key, the codebook C is revealed to the sender and all the receivers (including the eavesdropper).
Encoding: Upon observing a source sequence s n = (s 
where α j = P j λ j with transmitting power P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P m such that 0 ≤ m j=1 P j ≤ P . Decoding (for Legitimate Users): For legitimate user Bi, upon the received sequence y n i and the key k, the decoder reconstructs the source as follows.
The achievable region by the proposed scheme is given in the following theorem, the proof of which is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 8 (Performance of the Proposed Scheme). For vector Gaussian communication,
is achievable by the proposed secure analog scheme, if and only if
for some P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P m such that 0 ≤ m j=1 P j ≤ P , where
with µ and θ such that
Remark 1. Actually, in Theorem 8, R S (D 0 ) denotes rate-distortion function of source S, and R S|Z (D 0 ) denotes rate-distortion function of source S with side information Z available at both encoder and decoder, where
is independent of S.
Similar to scalar Gaussian communication case, the region of achievable (D 1 , D 2 ) and the region of achievable (R K , R L , D 0 ) depend on each other mutually through m variables P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P m which satisfies 0 ≤ m j=1 P j ≤ P . By choosing proper P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P m , the proposed scheme can achieve any distortion pair (D 1 , D 2 ) that linear JSCC scheme can achieve. This implies the proposed does not only improve the performance of secrecy, but also does not lose any performance of linear JSCC. This point is consistent with the scalar Gaussian case.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we studied joint source-channel secrecy problem of Gaussian broadcast communication in Shannon cipher system, in which list secrecy is used to measure secrecy. Then we proposed secure analog coding schemes for scalar and vector Gaussian communications by cascading linear coding and random orthogonal transform. The analysis and numerical results showed that the proposed JSCS scheme outperforms the sign-change based scheme. Moreover, under certain conditions, the proposed scheme does not lose any optimality. In addition, it is worth noting that different from the traditional construction of codebook in information theory, the codebook in the proposed scheme is constructed by generating a sequence of i.i.d. random matrices, instead of a sequence of i.i.d. random samples. Such construction of codebook is expected to be exploited to generate new ideas, strategies, and solutions for other problems in network information theory.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Observe that S n follows independent and identical Gaussian distribution, and for each k, T k is a orthogonal matrix. From the fact that Gaussian random variable is invariant to orthogonal transform, we have X n = αT k S n follows independent and identical Gaussian distribution as well. By law of large numbers,
for any > 0. Moreover, E (X 2 ) = P ≤ P . Hence the power constraint is satisfied.
In addition, for i = 1, 2, 
for any > 0. Moreover, Ed(S,
. Hence the distortion constraints at legitimate users are satisfied.
Next we prove the secrecy constraint is also satisfied, i.e., if
To that end, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.
[16] For a sequence of random variables {X n }, and a sequence of events {A n }, lim n→∞ P (A n ) = 0, if and only if lim n→∞ P [P (A n |X n ) > τ n ] = 0 for some sequence {τ n } with τ n > 0 and lim n→∞ τ n = 0.
From Lemma 2, to prove the secrecy constraint we only need to show that if R n satisfies (47), then
for some sequence {τ n } with τ n > 0 and lim n→∞ τ n = 0. Next we prove this.
where β = . It also can be verified that T K Z n → Z n → S n forms a Markov chain.
Besides, define envent
for δ > 0. The δ-typical set and the δ-jointly-typical set are defined according to the notion of weak typicality 4 , see [22] :
and
For jointly Gaussian variables X and Z, where Z = X + U and U is independent of X, the δ-typical set and the δ-jointly-typical set become
respectively, where N Z , N X and N U denote the variances of Z, X and U , respectively.
Since (S n , Z n ) is an i.i.d. sequence, from the fact that (weakly) typical set has total probability close to one [22] , we have the following two lemmas.
Consider that for each n, the optimal R n -rate henchman code that maximizes P d(S n ,Š n ) ≤ D 0 |CZ n is adopted, then we only need to show lim
for these codes. By utilizing Lemmas 2 and 3, we have
for some n and n that both vanish as n → ∞, where τ n = τ n − n . By choosing proper τ n , τ n can be set to some sequence that converges to zero sub-exponentially fast (i.e., τ n = 2 −o(n) ).
Since n vanishes as n → ∞, this guarantees that τ n also vanishes as n → ∞.
Owing to rate constraint, given (C, Z n ), the reconstructionŠ n cannot take more than R n values. Denote the set of possible values as c(C, Z n ), then
Now we apply a union bound to the right-hand side of (64) and write P miň
where (69) follows from the Markov chain CK → T K → S n Z n A and
Combine (63), (64), and (69), then we have
Since the reconstructionŠ n is taken from R n , to take the maximizing operation out of the probability by using union bound, we need discretize reconstructionŠ. Let
be a quantized version ofŠ, obtained by mappingŠ to the closest quantization point, i.e.,
Furthermore, it holds that
where (79) follows from triangle inequality. Hence for bounded
where ∆ is a term vanishing as ∆ → 0. Utilizing this inequality, we have
where D 0 D 0 + ∆ . Therefore, the probability in (75) is bounded as
and (85) follows that S n only appears in the ball with radius nλ (1 + δ), hence it is sufficient to only consider [š] n ∈ B n instead of the whole set N n .
In addition, observe that 5 |B n | ≤ Volume of n−ball with radius
log n+o(log n)) .
Therefore, if we can show that the probability in (87) decays doubly exponentially fast with n, then the proof will be complete. Consider that given
random variables, with mean
To complete the proof, we need introduce the following lemmas. The proofs of Lemmas 5 and 4 are given in Appendixes B and C, respectively.
, and o(1) is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and n → ∞.
Lemma 5. Assume S n ∼ N (0, N S I) and S n = T S n , with T uniformly distributed on orthogonal matrices set F (n) and independent of S n , then for any s n ,s n ∈ R n ,
5 Actually the upper bound can be tightened as
Denote S n T k S n , then it is easy to verify that for any T k , (S n , βZ n ) has the same distribution as (S n , Z n ), i.e., (S n , βZ
where (102) follows from Lemma 5. In addition, Lemma 4 implies
where (102) follows from T K Z n → Z n → S n . Using these bounds, we can apply Lemma 6 to the probability in (87) by identifying
Then we have
For small enough ∆, δ and large enough n, both α and β are positive and bounded away from zero, and (109) vanishes doubly exponentially fast. Therefore, the expression in (87) vanishes.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Consider that
Given Z n = z n , S n − z n ∼ N (0, N U I), and on the other hand, Gaussian distribution is isotropic (or invariant to rotation). Hence under condition of Z n = z n and R = r, S n is uniformly distributed over the sphere with center z n and radius √ nr.
and Ω (θ) be solid angle in n space of a cone with half-angle θ, i.e., the area of a spherical cap on a unit sphere (see Fig. 5 ). To approximate
, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 7. [24]
Let Ω (θ) be solid angle in n space of a cone with half-angle θ, then it holds Lemma 7 implies
= 2 n(log sin θ+o (1)) .
Combine (114), (115) and (118), then we have for any r ∈ N U (1 ± 2δ),
where o(1) is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and n → ∞. Combining (113) and (121) gives us Observe that
Since T is uniformly distributed on orthogonal matrices set (so is T T as stated in Theorem (1)), Theorem 2 implies that for any s n , T T s n is uniformly distributed over the sphere with center at the origin O and radius s n . Hence
where as described in the previous section, Ω (θ) denotes solid angle in n space of a cone with half-angle θ, and
From Lemma 7, we have for any s n such that
where o(1) is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and n → ∞. Combining (123) and (128) gives us . Then we only need to prove
First consider the case of
1, with probability p; 0, with probability 1 − p,
independent of (S, Z), denotes a timesharing random variable, and also assumě
where β = √ λP P +N 0 and T k is defined in (14) . Then
Therefore, to satisfy distortion constraint Ed(S,Š Q ) ≤ D 0 , it is sufficient to set p =
≤ I(S;Š Q Q|Z) (135)
≤ pI(S; K|Z, Q = 1) (139)
where (136) follows from Q is independent of (S, Z). 
Next consider the case of
The first term of (147) satisfies
and the term I(S;Š|ZK) in (147) satisfies
which implies
Combining (147), (148) and (153) gives us
S|Z (D 0 ). This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 8
Following similar steps to the proof of Theorem 3, it can be shown that for vector Gaussian case, the distortion constraint (33) and power constraint (34) are satisfied for the tuples given in Theorem 8.
Similar to Theorem 3, to prove the secrecy constraint we only need to show that if R n satisfies (154), then
for some sequence {τ n } with τ n > 0 and lim n→∞ τ n = 0. To this end, we follow similar steps to the proof of Theorem 3.
Besides, define envents
for δ > 0. Similar to Lemma 3, it can be shown that for any δ > 0, P A c j → 0, as n → ∞. The derivation up to (75) still holds for vector Gaussian case. Hence . Similar to (83), for vector Gaussian case we have
where D 0 D 0 + 2 ∆ . In addition, observe that 
Given [š] n and z n , ξ k,z n ([š] n ) , k ∈ 2 nR K are i.i.d. with mean
To bound (165), we need bound |B mn | and |D mn | first. Similar to (93), it can be shown
log n+o(log n)) . 
Combine it with
where l i,j Round
, then we have
In addition, n i=1 l i,j −ľ i,j 2 ∈ N ∪ {0}, hence
Observe that |B mn | grows more slowly than doubly exponential function, hence if we can
show that the probability in (165) decays doubly exponentially fast with n, then the proof will be complete. To that end, by using Lemma 4 we have 
where R S|Z (D) given in (41) denotes the rate-distortion function for source S with side information Z at both encoder and decoder, and o(1) is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and n → ∞. (175) follows from that |D mn | grows only polynomially fast with n.
From Lemma 5, we have for any z n ,
where R S (D) given in (40) denotes the point-to-point rate-distortion function for S.
Using these bounds, we can apply Lemma 6 to the probability in (165) 
This gives
For small enough ∆ and large enough n, both α and β are positive and bounded away from zero, and (183) vanishes doubly exponentially fast. Therefore, the expression in (165) vanishes.
This completes the proof of Theorem 8.
